"Fundamental Research means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community (as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons).  Fundamental Research Overview 

Proprietary Research means research and industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons (as distinguished from fundamental research- basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community).   

No, Information resulting from Fundamental Research is not subject to the export regulations.   

Remember: third-party proprietary information - even if used for a fundamental research project -   is subject to the export regulations and may need an export license to share with a foreign national (even a Stony Brook University employee),  

Third-party proprietary information is information from another source that is not in the public domain.  Third-party proprietary information is subject to the export regulations.  

Yes, the Fundamental Research Exclusion pertains to the INFORMATION resulting from fundamental research project. It does not pertain to the tangible products (e.g. materials, prototypes, equipment, software)  resulting from the fundamental research projects.  Classification Guidance  

A restricted party (or denied party as they are sometimes referred to) is an entity or individual that is placed on a denial list by the U.S. government or any other country’s government. A license from one, or more, of the federal agencies may be required if you plan on conducting any business or research with a restricted party, even if you are conducting Fundamental Research.  Restricted Party Overview

The export regulations include categories of information that are considered "publicly available" (available to the public without any restrictions). Publicly available information is not subject to the export regulations (e.g. ITAR, EAR), however - it can be prohibited to send publicly available information to an embargoed/sanctioned country without a license.  Publicly Available, Public Domain, and Published Overview

Embargo is a ban on trade for all transactions without a license whereas a sanction a prohibition on certain exports or activities without a license. Depending upon the sanction program restrictions may include: financial transactions, provision of services, shipment of particular items, travel, sharing of information that is not in the public domain.  

A voluntary disclosure is notification to a federal agency that an export violation may have or has occurred.  If it is found that an export violation did occur, a voluntary disclosure will be seen as a mitigating factor (in most cases) when determining penalties and/or sanctions.  If after reviewing the information provided on this website or any other export compliance resources and it is believed that an export violation may have occurred, please contact the Office of Research Compliance or use the University's Confidential Export Control Escalation Process.  

Before sharing information with collaborators, whether in the U.S. or abroad, determine if the information is publicly available - if not an export license may be required to share the information.     

SUNY Policies PROHIBIT the acceptance of any awards that:

• Restrict dissemination of research results (Document 1800) and/or
• Restrict foreign national participation (Document 1801)

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• Requests for justifiable exceptions to this policy, on a case-by-case basis, such as for the purpose of protecting state and national security, must be submitted to the Research Security Program team for submission for Chancellor or designee authority’s approval.
• Any projects that are granted exceptions to these SUNY policies will be further reviewed for the need of a Technology Control Plan and/or export licenses. 

A license or documented license exception is required for foreign persons to use ITAR controlled items and/or technical data.  

Yes, a specific license is required from the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) to attend a conference in Iran.  Contact the Research Security Program team. 

The Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) has a general license for specific types of programs, programs outside of these specifications require a specific license.  

Contact the Export Control Compliance team before engaging in an activity with a person in an embargoed or sanctioned country. 

No, all travel to Cuba requires either a general license or a specific license.  All travel to Cuba should be reviewed to confirm that travel is being conducted under the correct license type. Contact the Export Control Compliance team

Yes, travel to Iran is allowed. However, a general license or a specific license is required for most research and educational activities.  All travel to Iran should be reviewed to confirm that travel is being conducted under the correct license type. Contact the Export Control Compliance team

The federal government maintains lists of parties (individuals and organizations) with which you may be prohibited from certain types of engagement or interaction.  This can include foreign universities.  Collaborating  with restricted parties can create export control risks, including federal violations, as well as raise your risk profile.  Federal funding agencies are conducting foreign influence security reviews on researchers even for fundamental  research projects. 

Every situation will differ, contact the Research Security Program team for consultation and guidance.  in addition if you are sponsoring a research visitor and their home institution gets added to a restricted parties list, contact the above email address for guidance. 

While this is a very broad question that cannot be definitively answered in an FAQ, generally,  you cannot send (ship, mail, fax, email) items (i.e., materials, substances, equipment, technical data, and unpublished data) to a denied entity without an export control license.  However, the federal government will very likely deny the license request (i.e., there is a presumption of denial).

Collaborating with an individual that is from a restricted entity – particularly if located in a country of concern (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) – is extremely high risk.  Collaborating with restricted entities on a federally funded project is likely prohibited by the award language and could also impact your future funding.
At minimum, you will likely be asked to submit a mitigation plan (e.g., reporting international travel in advance, participating in research security training, and/or possibly agreeing not to collaborate with any individual from countries of concern during the award period).

As soon as possible, contact the Research Security Program team There are research integrity considerations, in addition to research security concerns (malign foreign influence, risk profile impact, etc.).  For example, we do not advise that you simply take someone’s name off a potential publication. This could trigger research integrity issues and be perceived by federal funding agencies as concealing a foreign collaborator. However, do not send anything to the restricted entity if they are located outside the country until you've had a discussion with the Research Security Program team. 

Consult with an Export Controls Compliance team, but generally speaking the answer is “no.”  Doing so may be a violation of federal law and will almost certainly
raise your risk profile with federal funding agencies. You often cannot pay a restricted entity or party without advanced federal authorization (e.g., a license or license exception).  

•DOD 1286 list is one of the most problematic lists. The 1286 List includes foreign institutions that have been confirmed as engaging in problematic activity as described in Section 1286(c)(8)(A) of the NDAA for FY2019.  Reference page 18 of the DOD Matrix for the 1286 list but note that it changes over time.

• BIS Entity List The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes the names of foreign persons – including entities (businesses, research institutions, government, and private organizations) and individuals, that are subject to specific license requirements for the export, reexport and/or transfer (in-country) of specified items. These persons comprise the Entity List (ELT), which is found on Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  

• Australian Unitracker: The “Unitracker” is not a denied entity list per se, it is a list compiled by an Australian think tank with funding from the U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center.  In some instances, but
not all, Unitracker entities may eventually appear on a U.S. government-denied list.

From an export control perspective, restricted parties:

• Require a federal license to share (ship, mail, or transfer) anything with a denied entity or 1286 entity. There is also a presumption of denial – the U.S. government will almost certainly deny the license.
• The U.S. government may occasionally grant visas for individuals who are affiliated with a restricted entity or 1286 entity.  If a visitor affiliated with a restricted entity or 1286 entity is in the U.S. on a valid visa, you may generally collaborate with the individual on fundamental research.  But the visitor's host cannot share items (data, equipment, materials, anything) with a restricted  entity (i.e., their affiliated institution).  If the visitor returns to a restricted or 1286 entity institution or leaves the U.S. and remains affiliated with the restricted entity, you cannot collaborate with them without a license.
• In addition, the visitor may not be able to work on federally funded projects and collaborating with them including publishing papers may impact your future federal funding. The federal government has various risk matrices for federal researchers and one of the high-risk indicators is collaborating with restricted parties. Some awards may have prohibitions in the award terms.
• In addition, working with or collaborating with a person associated with a restricted or 1286 entity is an extremely high risk from a foreign influence perspective.  It may negatively impact your future federal funding, particularly with the DoD. However, you will want to make sure you properly disclose any affiliations as under reporting this information can be problematic and violate federal law.